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ABSTRACT
We use the increases in health insurance coverage at age 65 generated by the rules of the
Medicare program to evaluate the effects of health insurance coverage on health related behaviors
and outcomes. The rise in overall coverage at age 65 is accompanied by a narrowing of disparities
across race and education groups. Groups with bigger increases in coverage at 65 experience bigger
reductions in the probability of delaying or not receiving medical care, and bigger increases in the
probability of routine doctor visits. Hospital discharge records also show large increases in
admission rates at age 65, especially for elective procedures like bypass surgery and joint
replacement. The rises in hospitalization are bigger for whites than blacks, and for residents of areas
with higher rates of insurance coverage prior to age 65, suggesting that the gains arise because of
the relative generosity of Medicare, rather than the availability of insurance coverage. Finally, there
are small impacts of reaching age 65 on self-reported health, with the largest gains among the groups
that experience the largest gains in insurance coverage. In contrast we find no evidence of a shift in
the rate of growth of mortality rates at age 65.
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One fifth of non-elderly adults in the United States lacked health insurance in 2002.
1  
Insured people are healthier than the uninsured, leading many analysts to conclude that access to 
health insurance is a public policy concern.
2  Nevertheless, credible evidence that insurance 
coverage causes better health is limited (Levy and Meltzer, 2001).  Insured and uninsured people 
exhibit many behavioral differences that are correlated with health, including diet, smoking, 
exercise, and seatbelt use.
3  Moreover, both the supply and demand for insurance depend on 
health status, creating simultaneity biases that could confound any causal effect of insurance 
coverage on health.  Indeed, the only randomized evaluation of free health insurance – the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment of the late 1970s – found insignificant impacts of insurance 
on the health status of the overall population (Newhouse et al, 1993). 
An ideal study of the causal effects of health insurance would randomly assign some 
people to universal coverage and others to the current system.  While no such experiments are in 
progress or currently planned, in this paper we argue that the Medicare eligibility rules create a 
reasonably close approximation to this ideal, with “randomization” based on whether an 
individual is just under or just over age 65.
4  The dramatic effects of Medicare eligibility on 
health insurance coverage are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows coverage rates by quarter of 
age from the 1992-2001 National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS).  The solid line in the figure 
                                                 
1 According to tabulations of the 2002 March Current Population Survey reported in Table 1 of Mills and Bhandari 
(2003), 19.5 percent of people between the ages of 18 and 64 had no health insurance coverage. 
2 Recent policy initiatives for expanding health insurance coverage among lower income adults are summarized in 
Krebs-Carter and Holohan (2002). 
3 For example, among 50-64 year olds in the 2002 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System sample, 20% of 
people with insurance smoke, compared with 30% of uninsured people; 75% of the insured exercise at least once 
per month, compared with 61% of the uninsured; 82% of the insured always wear seat belts in a car, compared to 
78% of the uninsured; and 88% of the insured eat a green salad at least once a week, compared with 79% of the 
uninsured. 
4 Previous researchers have used the age 65 boundary to look at health related outcomes, including Lichtenberg 
(2001), Decker and Rapaport (2002), and McWilliams et al. (2003).  Our contribution is to examine a wider 
variety of measures of access, utilization, and health, to quantify inter-group differences in responses to Medicare 
eligibility, and to focus on alternative causal channels for reaching age 65 to impact health care use and health 
outcomes.  4
represents the coverage rate for the overall population, which rises from 90 percent to 98 percent 
at age 65.
5  Even more striking is the impact on differences across socio-economic groups.  Prior 
to age 65 less-educated minorities (blacks, Asians, and Hispanics with less than 12 years of 
education) have about 20 percent lower coverage rates than more-educated whites.  After age 65 
the gap narrows to 5 percentage points.  If insurance coverage has a causal effect one would 
expect discontinuous changes in the age profiles of health outcomes at age 65, and a narrowing 
of inter-group disparities after age 65. 
In this paper we combine information from several sources to measure the impacts of 
Medicare eligibility on health-related outcomes.  We use survey data from the NHIS and the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) to examine changes in self-reported 
barriers to accessing care, and changes in the number of recent doctor visits, hospital stays, and 
frequency of diagnostic testing at age 65.  We use hospital discharge records from California and 
Florida to examine changes in the number and characteristics of hospital admissions at age 65.  
We examine the age profiles of health-related behaviors (smoking, exercise) and self-reported 
health using NHIS and BRFSS data.  Finally, we use micro data from the multiple cause of death 
files to study trends in death rates around age 65.  Throughout the paper we focus on the 
differential impacts of Medicare eligibility on different subgroups, and on the question of 
whether these impacts arise through changes in insurance coverage or alternative channels. 
As in other regression discontinuity studies, the key assumption in our research design is 
that measures of health care access, utilization and health status would evolve smoothly with age 
in the absence of the discrete change in insurance coverage at age 65.  This implies that 
Medicare eligibility is “as good as randomly assigned” among individuals who are just a little 
                                                 
5 As we discuss below, Medicare is not universal: an individual or their spouse must have a minimum of 40 quarters 
of work to be eligible. Medicare is also available to people under 65 in the Disability Insurance program.  5
older or a little younger than 65.
6  Although this assumption cannot be fully tested, it can be 
evaluated by checking for discontinuities in potential confounding variables like employment, 
income, and family structure.  All the potential confounding variables we examine trend 
smoothly through the age 65 barrier, suggesting that any discontinuities in health-related 
outcomes can be attributed to Medicare eligibility. 
We reach five main conclusions.  First, Medicare eligibility sharply reduces disparities in 
access to medical care.  Groups with large increases in insurance coverage at age 65 experience 
systematic reductions in the probability of delaying or not receiving medical care.  These groups 
also experience increases in the probability of visiting a doctor at least once per year, and in the 
frequency of routine medical checkups.  It is less clear whether Medicare eligibility leads to 
increases in specific preventative care procedures, such as blood cholesterol testing, 
mammography, or testing for prostate cancer, though this is partly an issue of statistical power.  
Second, eligibility for Medicare leads to a large (10 percent) rise in hospital stays, with the 
majority of the increase in non-emergency admissions and hospitalizations for elective 
procedures like joint replacements and bypass surgery.  Contrary to an insurance-based causal 
explanation, however, the rise in hospitalizations is larger for whites than blacks or Hispanics, 
and larger for residents of areas with higher insurance coverage rates prior to age 65.  Third, 
reaching age 65 has no systematic effect on smoking, exercise, or obesity.  Fourth, Medicare 
eligibility appears to have small but discernable effects on the level of self-reported health, with 
larger gains for groups whose insurance coverage rates increased the most after becoming 
Medicare eligible.  Fifth, we find no evidence of an immediate impact of Medicare eligibility on 
mortality rates at age 65, nor of a systematic change in the growth rate of mortality after 65, 
                                                 
6 Lee (2003) presents a formal framework for identification in a regression discontinuity framework.  6
though the latter finding must be interpreted cautiously in light of the difficulty in determining 
mortality trends in the absence of Medicare. 
I.  Empirical Approach and Relation to Existing Literature 
Our empirical analysis is based on a simple causal model of the effect of health insurance 
coverage on health outcomes: 
(1) yija  =  Xijaαj  +  fj(a)  + Cijaδj + uija , 
where yija is a measured outcome for individual i in group j at age a,  Xija represents a set of 
measured characteristics with group-specific coefficients (αj),  fj(a) is a smooth function 
representing the age profile of the outcome y (e.g., a low order polynomial), Cija is a dummy 
variable indicating whether individual i has insurance coverage, and uija is an unobserved error 
component.  There are a number of difficult issues underlying the specification of equation (1).  
One problem is that health insurance is heterogeneous (Levy and Meltzer, 2001).  This is 
important because at age 65 many people who were previously covered by other forms of 
insurance switch to Medicare.  Since Medicare has different reimbursement rates and coverage 
provisions than other insurance packages, this switch could have a causal effect even in the 
absence of any change in coverage.  A second and related issue is that the shape of the age 
profile fj(a) may be influenced by the presence of Medicare.  For example, 64 year-olds may 
delay certain medical procedures until after age 65 in anticipation of Medicare coverage.
7  Such 
behavior will complicate inferences based on changes from before to after 65.  Third, even 
within groups the causal effect of health insurance may differ across people.  Heterogeneity in δj 
introduces the usual problem of distinguishing between average treatment effects and the effect 
for those whose insurance status changes at age 65 (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). 
                                                 
7 The evidence reported later in this paper shows no evidence of anticipatory behavior.  7
Setting these issues aside for the moment, the key problem in estimating equation (1) is 
that health insurance coverage is endogenous.  For example, if people with pre-existing 
conditions cannot obtain health insurance, the error term will be correlated with coverage, 
leading to a positive bias in the estimated effect of coverage on health.  Conversely, if healthy 
people are more likely to go without insurance there will be an upward bias in the estimated 
effect of insurance on medical care utilization and a downward bias in the estimated effect on 
health.
8  The age limit for Medicare eligibility at 65 provides a candidate instrumental variable 
for insurance coverage.  As shown in Figure 1, insurance coverage rates increase sharply as 
individuals pass their 65
th birthday, implying that the instrument has a powerful effect. 
Let Da denote an indicator for being 65 or older, and consider the following first stage 
model for insurance coverage: 
(2) Cija  =  Xija β
C
j  +  g
C
j(a)  +  Da π
C





j is a vector of group-specific coefficients, g
C
j(a) is the age profile in coverage for group 
j and Da is a dummy for Medicare eligibility.  Combining (1) and (2), the reduced form model for 
the health outcome y is 
(3)   yija  =  Xija β
y
j  +  g
y
j(a)  +  Da π
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j  is a group-specific set of coefficients, g
y
j(a) is a smooth age profile,  and  π
y
j =  π
C
j × δj 
is the reduced form effect of reaching age 65 on outcome y.  The (population) instrumental 
variables estimate of the causal effect δj is just the ratio of the reduced form coefficient of Da to 
the corresponding first stage coefficient: 
(4)   δ
IV
j   =  π
y
j /  π
C
j    . 
                                                 
8 See Bhattacharya and Vogt (2003) for a recent survey of adverse selection issues in the health insurance market.  8
In our empirical analysis, we fit models like (2) and (3) to individual outcome data using 
OLS and probit estimators.  Since the age profiles and the dummy Da are the same for all 
individuals in the same age cell, however, identification of π
C
j  and π
y
j comes from variation 
across age cells.
9  Suppressing the j subscripts for different groups, let Ca and ya denote the 
population means of insurance coverage and the outcome variable in age cell a.  Ignoring 
variation in the X’s (or assuming the age cell means have been adjusted for any variation), 
equations (2) and (3) imply: 
(2a) Ca  =  k1   +   g
C(a)   +   Da π
C  , 
(3a)   ya  =  k2   +   g
y(a)   +   Da π
y  . 
Standard theoretical treatments of regression discontinuity methods assume that age is measured 
continuously (e.g., Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaaw, 2001).  Under this assumption, as long as 
the g( ) functions are continuous, π
C  and  π
y can be estimated consistently by averaging C and y 
in appropriate-sized windows on either side of age 65.  In our data sets, however, age is 
measured in coarse intervals (either a quarter or a year), so the difference in means between 
people just over 65 and those just under 65 contains a potentially non-negligible trend 
component that must be estimated parametrically.  An advantage of a parametric approach is that 
it provides some smoothing of the estimated means of the outcome data on either side of the 65 
boundary. 
The necessity of fitting a parametric model to the age profiles of C and y introduces an 
important consideration for inference.  If equation (2a) or (3a) is fit to cell means with a specific 
functional form for the g(·) function, the error component will consist of sampling error in the 
                                                 
9 It is well known that OLS estimators of the age-related parameters in models like (2) or (3) can be obtained in two 
stages, by first regressing the dependent variable on the X’s and unrestricted age dummies, and in the second stage 
using the estimated age dummies as dependent variables to fit the age functions via a generalized least squares 
procedure.  9
cell mean plus any specification error.
10  Conventional standard errors obtained by estimating the 
discontinuity with the cell mean data incorporate both components.  If the same model is 
estimated using the underlying micro data, however, any specification error will be ignored in 
the calculation of the conventional standard errors.  A simple remedy is to calculate the standard 
errors for the micro level model allowing for a shared error component for all observations of the 
same age (i.e., cluster by age).  This method uses the variability in mean behavior around the 
parametric age profile at other ages to estimate the sampling error of the estimated change at 65. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a key feature of Medicare is that it reduces disparities in health 
insurance coverage across groups.  This provides the basis for a test that the impact of Medicare 
eligibility on a specific outcome arises through the effect on coverage, rather than through other 
channels.  Specifically, consider a regression of π
y
j (the reduced form estimate of the effect of 
Medicare eligibility on outcome y for subgroup j) on π
C
j (the first stage estimate of the effect of 
Medicare eligibility on health insurance coverage for subgroup j): 
(5)  π
y
j  =   d0   +   d1 π
C
j   +    ej . 
If Medicare eligibility only affects y through its effect on insurance coverage, and if the causal 
effect of insurance coverage (δj) is constant across groups, then d0 = 0 and d1 = δ.
11  On the other 
hand, if the responses of outcome y to Medicare eligibility arise because of the more generous 
Medicare coverage, then one might expect a non-zero constant in equation (5) and a less 




j.  Even if Medicare eligibility only matters through 
                                                 
10 For example, let ma denote the observed mean of outcome y for age a, and let G(a)= k2 + g
y(a) + Daπ
y  represent 
the parametric model.  Then ma=G(a) + ( ma-ya ) + (ya-G(a)).  One source of specification error is unobserved 
cohort effects. In our estimation the potential for such effects is reduced by pooling several cross sections. 




j is to combine the data for different subgroups, use 
the interaction of Da and dummies for the different subgroups as instruments for insurance coverage, and perform 
an over-identification test.  In an over-identified model, the conventional IV estimator can be obtained from a 
generalized least squares regression of the reduced form coefficients on the first stage coefficients.  The over-
identification test amounts to a test that the R-squared of this regression is close enough to 1, given the sampling 
errors of the coefficients.  10
coverage, the intercept in equation (5) could be non-zero if there is significant heterogeneity in δj 




An important concern with the use of the Medicare eligibility rules to infer the causal 
effect of health insurance is that other factors may also change discretely at age 65.  For 
example, 65 is a relatively common retirement age (although two thirds of men and three 
quarters of women have left the labor force by age 64).  The potential for a variable like 
employment status to confound the comparison of people on either side of age 65 can be 
assessed by fitting a model like (2) for that variable, and testing for jumps at age 65.  A specific 
parameterization of the age profile function g(·) is “flexible enough” if there are no significant 
jumps in the observed confounding variables at 65 when this age function is included in the 
model. 
A final point worth noting is that although we estimate models like (2) and (3) using 
repeated cross sections of data, the models could be estimated using true longitudinal data.
13  The 
key advantage of longitudinal data is power: most behaviors and outcomes are strongly 
positively correlated over time, so changes at age 65 can be estimated more precisely with 
longitudinal data than with repeated cross sections.  In the absence of true panel data, we 
compensate by pooling data from different survey years to increase our sample sizes. 
                                                 
12 For example, let δ represent the mean value of δj , and assume that E[ δj-δ |  π
C
j ] = λ π
C




j ] = δ 
π
C
j   +   λ (π
C
j)
2 .  If λ>0, π
y
j is a convex function of π
C
j and a linear regression will have a negative intercept, while 
if λ< 0 the relationship is concave and the intercept of the linear regression will be positive. 
13 McWilliams et al. (2003) use longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine 
changes in some heath related outcomes from before to after age 65.  Unfortunately, the HRS is only administered 
every 2 years so it is not possible to isolate changes occurring from just before to just after age 65.  Kasper et al. 
(2000) use data from the Kaiser Survey of Family Health Experiences to look at changes in health outcomes that 
occur with changes in insurance status (for non-elderly adults).  Neither study tries to deal with the endogeneity of 
insurance status.  11
II. Differences Among Insured and Uninsured Near-Elderly 
To begin our empirical analysis, Table 1 shows some of the average characteristics of 
near-elderly people (ages 62-64) with and without health insurance.  The data in this Table are 
drawn from the 1992-2001 NHIS and the 1998-2002 BRFSS.  We present overall means in the 
first column, means for the insured and uninsured in columns 2 and 3, and simple t-tests for the 
difference in means by insurance status in the fourth column. 
As has been shown in many other studies (e.g., Mills and Bhandari, 2003) insurance 
status is highly correlated with marital status, race, and education.  Health care access and 
utilization rates also vary with insurance status.  Uninsured people are more likely to report that 
they delayed medical care or did not get care in the past year for cost reasons (as was recently 
noted in Ayanian et al., 2000), and also report lower rates of use of medical services, including 
routine doctor visits and diagnostic exams.  Interestingly, the comparisons in Table 1 show that 
the uninsured are less likely to report having been diagnosed with hypertension or heart-related 
problems than people with insurance.  This could reflect the fact that insurance is more valuable 
for people with known health problems, or lack of awareness of latent conditions among the 
uninsured.  Despite lower reported rates of hypertension and heart problems, the uninsured have 
lower self-assessed health, a pattern that is potentially supportive of an awareness explanation. 
Some of the observed health differences between the insured and uninsured groups in 
Table 1 are arguably a result of the different compositions of the two populations.  Table 2 
presents comparisons of some key outcomes by insurance status for four narrowly defined 
subgroups, based on education (high school diploma or not) and ethnicity (white non-Hispanic or 
not).  For example, columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 compare the fractions of insured and uninsured 
people in different subgroups who reported that they delayed receiving health care last year for  12
cost reasons.  The rates for insured and uninsured people in the four subgroups are quite similar, 
suggesting that insurance status is more important than education or ethnicity in explaining 
reported delays in health care.  A similar pattern holds for the probability of seeing a doctor at 
least once in the past year (columns 5 and 6).  Doctor visit rates for the insured fall in a narrow 
range around 85 percent while rates for the uninsured center around 65 percent.  For the other 
outcomes in Table 2, however, incidence rates vary more across subgroups even holding 
constant insurance status.  For example, the probability of a hospital stay in the past year ranges 
from 10 to 15 percent among insured people in different race/education groups, and from 5 to 9 
percent among uninsured people.  Mammography and cholesterol testing rates also vary 
substantially by education, holding constant insurance status. 
III. Changes in Insurance Coverage at Age 65 
Medicare is available to people who are at least 65 years of age and who worked at least 
40 quarters in covered employment (or have a spouse who qualifies for coverage).
14  For those 
whose meet the eligibility criteria, Medicare hospital insurance (Part A) is available free of 
charge and Medicare Part B (Medicare insurance) is available for a modest monthly premium.  
Normally, individuals who are approaching their 65
th birthday  receive notice of impending 
eligibility and are informed that they have to enroll in the program and choose whether or not to 
accept Medicare Part B coverage.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of reaching the Medicare eligibility age on 
insurance coverage, based on alternative specifications of equation (2) fit to data from the 1992-
                                                 
14Medicare is also available to people under 65 who are receiving Disability Insurance, and those with kidney 
disease. Individuals who do not qualify on the basis of their own or their spouse’s work history may still enroll in 
Medicare at age 65 by paying monthly premiums for both Part A and Part B coverage.  This option is limited to 
U.S. citizens and legal aliens with at least five years of residency in the U.S.  13
2001 NHIS.
15  In all cases the age profile function (g
C(a)) is assumed to be quadratic with 
coefficients that are allowed to differ for those older or younger than 65.  This functional form 
assumes that the age profile is continuous at age 65, but allows both the first and second 
derivatives to jump discretely at 65.  We report estimates for the entire sample in the top row, 
and for four ethnicity/education categories, three ethnicity groups, and for men and women. 
The models in the first column of Table 3 are fit to mean coverage rates by quarter of 
age.  As suggested by the patterns in Figure 1, the jumps in coverage at age 65 are precisely 
estimated, reflecting the smoothness of the coverage profiles before and after 65 and the 
sharpness of the rise at 65.  The gain in coverage for the overall population is estimated to be 8.4 
percentage points, while the gains by ethnicity/education group range from 5.3 to 18.8 
percentage points.  Interestingly, the estimated gain is about one third larger for women than 
men. 
Column 2 reports estimates of the same specifications, fit by linear probability model to 
the underlying micro data.  Since we used a weighted estimation procedure for the cell-level 
models the coefficient estimates are identical in columns 1 and 2.
16  As expected, however, the 
standard errors are slightly different.  The standard errors in column 2 are calculated allowing 
heteroskedasticity and an unrestricted correlation structure for observations from the same age 
cell.  These are larger than the conventional standard errors for the same micro models (which 
ignore clustering by age), but about the same size as the standard errors from the cell level 
models.  Column 3 presents models in which we add a set of micro-level control variables, 
including dummies for the survey year and for gender, ethnicity, education and region.  Although 
                                                 
15 We construct age in our NHIS samples from data on year and month of birth and quarter of the interview, as well 
as age (reported in years).  The latter information allows us to precisely separate people on either side of their 65th 
birthday.  We restrict the samples to people between 55.25 and 74.75 (79 quarters). 
16 Specifically, we weight the cell-level observations by the sum of the sampling weights for the people in each cell.  
The micro models are weighted, using the individual sampling weights.  14
the covariates are highly significant, they vary smoothly with age, and the point estimates of the 
rise in coverage at age 65 are hardly affected.  Finally, in column 4 we fit the micro level models 
using a probit procedure to account for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.  The 
table reports derivatives of the predicted probabilities of coverage, evaluated at the mean 
predicted probability.  These are uniformly smaller than estimated jumps in coverage from the 
linear probability models, but provide a qualitatively similar picture. 
We have experimented with a number of alternative specifications and sample choices 
for estimating the effects of reaching age 65 on insurance coverage.  Appendix Table 1 reports 
results from models like those in Table 3 fit to the last 5 years of the NHIS data (1997-2001) and 
to the 1998-2002 BRFSS sample.
17  The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the 
results in Table 3.  We have also examined different specifications of the age profiles.  For 
example, in some specifications we included a cubic or quartic of age rather than the quadratic 
interacted with the post-65 dummy.  The sizes of the estimated jumps in coverage at age 65 are 
robust to all the alternatives we have tried. 
Examining changes in the probability of any health insurance coverage at age 65 ignores 
potential changes in the composition of insurance coverage.  Immediately upon reaching age 65, 
many people drop (or lose) private insurance coverage, while others obtain multiple coverage.  
Figure 2 shows the age profiles of Medicare coverage for the same groups as in Figure 1, while 
column 5 of Table 3 reports estimates of the rise in Medicare coverage at 65 (based on a linear 
probability model identical to the specification in column 3).  Medicare coverage rates are low 
but rising before age 65, reflecting the movement of non-elderly disabled people onto the Social 
                                                 
17 In the BRFSS individuals are asked their current age but not their date of birth, so we use age in years rather than 
quarters.  To increase the number of age cells, we use data from ages 50-80.  We also used March Current 
Population Survey data to look at the age profile of insurance coverage.  Results are qualitatively similar, although 
insurance coverage rates are a little different in the CPS, reflecting in part the wording of the coverage question, 
which refers to coverage at any time in the previous calendar year.  15
Security Disability Insurance (DI) program.  As noted elsewhere (e.g. Autor and Duggan, 2003), 
DI participation is particularly high for less-educated minorities, reaching 20 percent by age 64.  
Immediately after age 65, average Medicare participation rates rise to around 85 percent, with 
higher rates for highly educated whites and lower rates for less-educated blacks and Hispanics.
18  
The reversal of Medicare participation rankings across education/ethnicity groups at age 65 
means that the groups with bigger gains in net insurance coverage at age 65 have smaller rises in 
Medicare coverage.   
To what extent do changes in health insurance coverage at 65 coincide with other discrete 
changes?  An obvious confounder is employment.  Historically, many public and private 
pensions became available at 65, and 65 was widely imposed as a mandatory retirement age.
19  
Figure 3 shows the age profile of employment for men, along with the corresponding profile of 
insurance coverage.
20  Unlike insurance coverage, employment rates decline smoothly from age 
55 onward, with no evidence of a discontinuous shift at age 65.  The first column of Appendix 
Table 2 reports estimation results for a set of employment models similar to the specifications in 
column 3 of Table 3, based on pooled 1992-2001 NHIS data.  The estimated jumps in 
employment at age 65 are generally small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, with the 
exception of a positive and significant rise for less educated minorities.  Similar models fit to cell 
level data on current employment status from the pooled 1996-2002 March Current Population 
Surveys, reported in the second column of the table, also yield estimated jumps at 65 that are 
small in magnitude and mostly statistically insignificant.  Interestingly, the estimated jump in 
                                                 
18 Incomplete coverage of people over 65 reflects a number of factors, including the minimum work history 
requirements for Medicare and under-reporting. 
19 See von Wachter (2002) for an analysis of retirement rates and the impact of changes in laws governing 
compulsory retirement.  Over the past two decades 62 has replaced 65 as the most common retirement age. 
20 The corresponding figure for women shows the same smooth decline in employment though women start with 
significantly lower employment rates at age 55 than men.  16
employment for less educated minorities in the CPS data is negative, suggesting that the positive 
estimate in NHIS data is spurious.  We conclude that employment changes are relatively smooth 
at age 65, and are unlikely to drive changes in health-related outcomes around age 65. 
We have also investigated the age profiles of marriage, family income, and residential 
mobility using the 1996-2002 CPS data.  Columns 3-6 of Appendix Table 2 show the estimated 
jumps at age 65 in the fraction of people who are married and living with their spouse, the 
fractions whose annual family income is under $10,000, under $15,000, and under $20,000, and 
the fraction who changed houses in the past year.
21  For the overall sample and for the four 
education/ethnicity subgroups, none of these outcomes shows a large or statistically significant 
change at age 65.  These results suggest that family structure, family location, and family income 
all evolve smoothly around age 65, and are unlikely to confound our analysis of the impact of 
Medicare eligibility. 
IV. Changes in Health Care Access and Utilization at Age 65 
a. Measures of Access 
We now turn to an analysis of the effects of reaching age 65 on access to and utilization 
of health care services.  We begin with self-reported measures of access.  Starting in 1997, the 
NHIS asked two questions of all adults in the survey: (1) “during the past 12 months has medical 
care been delayed for this person because of worry about the cost?”  (2) “during the past 12 
months was there any time when this person needed medical care but did not get it because (this 
person) could not afford it?”  Recent waves of the BRFSS have asked a closely related question: 
“Was there a time during the past 12 months when you needed to see a doctor but could not 
                                                 
21 We do not report results on the poverty rate (or on income relative to the poverty line) because the poverty line 
changes discretely at age 65.  For example, the poverty line for a single individual is reduced by 8% when the 
person reaches 65.  As one would expect, graphs of poverty rates by age show a small jump down at 65.  The 
samples include individuals aged 50-79.  17
because of the cost?”  Figure 4 shows the age profiles of responses to the first question in the 
NHIS, while Figures 5a and 5b show the age profiles of responses the second question in the 
NHIS and the similar question in the BRFSS.  Consistent with the hypothesis that having 
medical insurance increases access to medical care, all three graphs show a sharp drop in the 
fraction of less-educated minorities who report delaying or not getting care after age 65. 
The first three columns of Table 4 show the estimated changes in the probability of 
delaying or not receiving medical care at age 65, based on linear probability models similar to 
those in column 3 of Table 3.  As suggested by the patterns in Figures 4 and 5, all three access 
measures show significant decreases at age 65 among less educated minorities.  There is also 
reasonably strong evidence of a discrete change in access for all blacks and all Hispanics.  The 
estimated jumps in column 3 (based on the BRFSS question) are larger than the estimates in 
column 2 (based on the similar question in the NHIS), and suggest very systematic impacts of 
insurance coverage on medical care access.  The ratio of the coefficients in column 3 to those in 
column 3 of Table 3 ranges from -0.2 to -0.6, with most of the implied IV estimates of the effect 
of insurance on the probability of not receiving care in the range of -0.3 to -0.4.
22  Corresponding 
estimates based on the NHIS version of the question imply smaller effects, ranging from 0 to -
0.3.  Given the apparent sensitivity of responses to the question based on wording and placement 
in the survey, the magnitude of the effects from the BRFSS should probably be viewed 
cautiously.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that the incidence of cost-related access problems falls 
sharply at age 65 among the groups with the largest gains in insurance coverage.
23 
                                                 
22 The impacts of reaching age 65 on insurance coverage using the BRFSS data tend to be a little larger than those 
in Table 3 (see Appendix Table 2), implying slightly smaller IV estimates. 
23 Because the questions on access refer to the previous year, our estimates of the effect of reaching 65 on access 
problems are potentially attenuated.  Specifically, someone who turned 65 less than a year ago could have had 
problems in the months before his or her birthday.  The attenuation may be mitigated by recall errors and the 
saliency of the recent past.  18
Another measure of access to the health care system is whether an individual has a usual 
place for routine preventative care.  Since the late 1990s the NHIS has included a sequence of 
questions that can be used to construct such a measure.
24  As shown in column 4 of Table 4, there 
is some indication that the probability of having a usual place for routine preventative care rises 
at age 65, especially for black non-Hispanics.  Unlike the measures of delaying or not receiving 
care, however, this measure shows only a small effect for less educated minorities. 
b. Doctor Visits and Hospitalization 
The right hand columns of Table 4 present estimation results for two key measures of 
health care utilization: did the individual have at least one doctor visit in the past year?  Did the 
individual have one or more overnight hospital stays in the past year?  (Both measures are taken 
from the 1992-2001 NHIS).  Since these questions refer to flows over the past year, they will not 
necessarily respond instantaneously to changes in insurance coverage.  To the extent that  
uninsured people are delaying or not getting care, however, one might expect discrete changes at 
age 65 as Medicare becomes available. 
Figure 6 shows the age profiles for the fraction of people with at least one doctor visit in 
the previous year.  A close look at the graph suggests that the gap in frequency of doctor visits 
between less educated minorities and other groups closes between ages 65 and 66, although the 
age profiles are noisy.  The estimates in column 5 of Table 4 confirm that less educated whites, 
less educated minorities, and non-Hispanic blacks all show significant or nearly significant rises 
in the probability of visiting a doctor after age 65.  These patterns are consistent with the 
estimates for the access measures in columns 1-3. 
                                                 
24 The survey first asks if a person has a place they usually go when sick, and if yes, whether they also get routine 
preventative care there, or somewhere else.  For those who do not identify a place they usually go when sick, a 
third question asks if they have a place they usually go for routine preventative care.  These questions are only 
asked of the “sample adult” in each household.  19
Figure 7 shows the age profiles of the incidence of an overnight hospital stay.  There is a 
discernable jump in the hospitalization rate of the overall population, but unlike the patterns in 
many of the previous graphs there is no indication that the rise is bigger for less educated 
minorities.  Consistent with this conclusion, the estimated changes in the probability of a hospital 
stay in column 6 of Table 4 are fairly stable across groups.  The point estimates center around 1-
2 percentage points – a relatively large effect, considering that the probability of a hospital stay 
in the previous year for 64 year olds is around 12 percent.  In the next section we use very large 
samples of hospital discharge records to refine these estimates.  As in the models in column 6, 
the discharge data suggest that increases in hospitalization at 65 are if anything smaller for 
subgroups with the larger net gains in insurance coverage. 
c. Screening and Preventative Care  
One concern often raised about lack of health insurance coverage is that the uninsured 
will not get preventative care, leading to long term health problems that could have been avoided 
by earlier diagnosis and prophylactic treatment (e.g., Powell-Griner et al., 1999).  Table 5 
presents estimates of the impact of reaching age 65 on several measures of preventative care, 
including influenza vaccination, blood cholesterol screening, mammography, and screening for 
prostate cancer.  All these models are estimated using data from the 1999-2002 BRFSS.
25  As 
with doctor visits and hospitalization, one issue with outcomes like mammography or prostate 
screening is that people may not respond instantaneously to the availability of insurance.  To 
partially address this concern, we include models for whether an individual has ever had a 
mammogram or either a digital rectal exam or prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test.  The final 
                                                 
25 A major problem with the BRFSS is that not all questions are asked in all states in all years.  For example, the flu 
shot question was only asked in a minority of states in 2000, cholesterol testing was only asked in most states in 
1999 and 2001, and the prostate screening questions were only asked in most states in 2001 and 2002.  20
column of Table 5 also reports a model for the probability of ever having been diagnosed with 
hypertension. 
Column 1 reports models for having a flu shot in the past year.  Only the age profile of 
less educated whites shows a significant jump at 65, though the standard errors for all groups are 
relatively large.
26  The models for recent cholesterol testing in column 2 also show a large jump 
for less-educated whites at age 65, and relatively modest changes for other groups.
27  The models 
for the probability of having a mammogram in the past two years yield relatively imprecise 
estimates, but point toward a large gain for less educated minorities.  The age profiles for this 
outcome are shown in Figure 8.  The profile for less educated minorities rises at age 65, but the 
variability of the profile at earlier and later ages suggests the need for caution in inferring too 
much from the point estimates in Table 5.  Although for space reasons we have not included a 
graph of the age profiles for the probability of ever having a mammogram, these are flat by age 
50, suggesting that there are very few women who have their first mammogram after reaching 
middle age.  As shown by the estimates in column 4 of Table 5 there is no indication of an 
upward jump after age 65 for any of the subgroups.  In fact, the probability of ever having a 
mammogram among Hispanic women is estimated to drop down.  Since the true response cannot 
decline, we attribute this estimate to an unlucky combination of sampling errors. 
We have also fit a series of models for the probability of a clinical breast examination in 
the past two years, and the probability of a pap smear test in the past two years.  None of the 
                                                 
26 Overall, the rate of flu shots for 64 year olds is about 50 percent, with variation across ethnic and education 
groups that follows the expected pattern.  The fraction of people who have a shot is strongly increasing with age 
for groups.  The 5 point rise for less-educated whites is readily discernable in a graph.  The increase in flu shots 
should be interpreted with caution given that the CDC’s list of groups at risk of flu related complications includes 
adults age 65 or older. 
27 About 82 percent of 64 year olds report having had a cholesterol test in the past two years.  The rate for better 
educated whites is about 86 percent while the rate for less educated whites and less educated minorities is 72 
percent.  21
estimated jumps at age 65 for the various subgroups are statistically significant for either 
outcome, although this is partly a reflection of relatively large sampling errors – in the range of 
1-2 percent for most subgroups, and about 3 percent for less educated minorities.  Thus, we 
cannot rule out effect sizes as large as 4-5 percent in most cases. 
Columns 5 and 6 refer to the incidence of tests for prostate cancer.  We decided to 
combine the two tests (the traditional digital rectal exam and the more recent prostate specific 
antigen blood test) to focus on the possibility that older men had neither test.
28  Unfortunately, 
the sampling errors for this outcome are relatively large, reflecting the fact that the questions 
were only asked in most states in the two most recent years of our BRFSS sample.  The results in 
column 5 suggest an impact of reaching age 65 on screening rates among Hispanics but not for 
blacks, leading to mixed results in the two minority/education categories.  The results for the 
ever tested measure in column 6 are all insignificant and more narrowly centered around 0. 
A final preventative care outcome considered in Table 5 is the probability of ever being 
diagnosed with hypertension.  Untreated high blood pressure is an important health risk, 
especially among minorities (Hyman and Pavlik, 2001), although lack of treatment does not 
necessarily arise because people are unaware of their condition.  Nevertheless, the estimates in 
the final column of the table (which are based on the subset of “sample adults” in the 1997-2001 
NHIS) suggest that there is a sizeable increase in the fraction of minorities of both higher and 
lower educational attainment who are diagnosed with hypertension at age 65.
29  A graph reveals 
that although the age profiles for the two minority groups are noisy, they seem to jump after age 
                                                 
28 The Food and Drug Administration approved the PSA test in conjunction with a digital rectal exam to help detect 
cancer (National Cancer Institute, 2001).  In the data, most men report receiving both tests or neither. 
29 Overall, about 45 percent of 64 year olds report having been diagnosed with hypertension at some point.  The rate 
is around 42 percent for more educated whites, and 60 percent for less educated minorities.  22
65.  As with the other preventative care measures in Table 5, however, the underlying sample 
sizes are not large enough to permit precise inferences. 
Our reading of the results in Table 5 is that they lend support to the hypothesis that 
Medicare eligibility at age 65 leads to modest increases in the incidence of preventative 
screening, and that the increase is concentrated among groups with a larger rise in net insurance 
coverage.  Unfortunately, our main data source for preventative screening – the BRFSS – did not 
ask screening questions in all states in all years.  Moreover, breast cancer and prostate cancer are 
gender-specific so the sample sizes for these outcomes are cut in half.  Because of these data 
limitations, and the fact that people may not seek screening immediately after getting insurance, 
the power of our discontinuity-based research design is limited, and we cannot reach definitive 
conclusions. 
V. Changes in Hospitalization - Evidence from Discharge Data 
Survey data from the NHIS and BRFSS suggest that reaching age 65 has a significant 
effect on the extent and composition of insurance coverage, on self-reported access to care, and 
on utilization of medical services.  In particular, data from the NHIS show a surprisingly large 
increase in hospitalization rates at age 65, fairly evenly distributed across subgroups.  In this 
section we use data from the hospital discharge records for the states of California and Florida to 
examine changes in the number and characteristics of hospital admissions by age.  These 
administrative data sets are very large and provide detailed information on the reasons for 
admission to the hospital, the procedures performed, and the cost and duration of the hospital 
stay.  Their main disadvantage is the absence of information on a patient’s education (a key 
determinant of pre-65 insurance coverage) and the fact that we only see people who enter the 
hospital.  For comparison with the state data, we also make use of national samples from the  23
National Hospital Discharge Survey.  While these data have the advantage of being drawn from 
a nationally representative survey, they have a limited set of covariates and smaller sample sizes. 
Our approach to the problem of only observing those who enter the hospital is to assume 
that the underlying population at risk for hospitalization varies smoothly with age.  Specifically, 
consider a simple reduced form model for pja, the probability that an individual of age a in 
subgroup j is admitted to the hospital in a given time interval:  
(6)   log (pja)  =   g
p
j(a)  +  Da π
p
j   +   v
p
ja   , 
where g
p
j(a) is a smooth age profile, Da is a dummy for age 65 or older, and v
p
ja is a specification 
error component.  Let Nja represent the population in subgroup j of age a and let Aja represent the 
number who are admitted to hospital, so the ratio Aja/Nja is an estimate of pja.  Finally, assume 
that the log of the population in group j at different ages follows a smooth trend: 
(7) log  (Nja) = hj(a)  . 
Equations (6) and (7) imply that the log of the number of hospital admissions in subgroup j at 
age a is given by: 
(8) log  (Aja)  =   [ g
p
j(a) +  hj(a) ]  +  Da π
p
j  +   v
p
ja  +   εja , 
where   
εja   =   log (Aja/Nja)-log (pja)  
represents sampling error in the observed admission ratio.  Provided that the underlying 
population varies smoothly by age, any discontinuity in hospital admissions at age 65 can be 
attributed to a corresponding discontinuity in the log of the probability of admission. 
Our state-level hospital discharge data files consist of 100% of individuals who were 
admitted to hospitals in California or Florida and discharged between January 1
st 1995 and 
December 31
st 1999 (in the case of California) or between January 1
st 1995 and December 31
st  24
2000 (in the case of Florida).
30  We focus on individuals between the ages of 50 and 75 at the 
time of their admission, yielding samples of 4,069,049 discharges in California and 3,550,784 in 
Florida.  In the national data, we pool discharges for individuals in the same age range during 
1995-1999, and obtain a sample of 413,866 observations. 
Figure 9 shows the age profiles of the overall number of admissions in California and 
Florida.  To make it easier to compare the two states, we have normalized each series by the log 
of the average number of discharges among 60-64 year olds.  In both states there is clear 
evidence of a discontinuous increase in hospital admissions at age 65, equivalent to about a 5-10 
percent rise.  Interestingly, the rise seems to be “permanent” – the state-specific age trend in 
admissions is about the same between ages 65 and 70 as between ages 60 and 64.  The lack of 
any relative decline from 65 to 66 suggests that the jump at 65 is primarily the result of new 
admission criteria being applied once potential admittees become Medicare-eligible, rather than 
to a “catch-up” for care that had been deferred prior to age 65. 
Figure 10 shows the age profiles in admissions for three major ethnic groups (white non-
Hispanics, black non-Hispanics, and Hispanics) in the two states.  In both states whites 
experience the largest proportional increases in hospital admissions, with slightly smaller rises 
for Hispanics and virtually no rise for blacks.  These patterns are potentially surprising, 
considering that the rise in net insurance coverage at age 65 is largest for Hispanics, smallest for 
whites, and in the middle for blacks.
31 
The upper panel of Table 6 shows estimates of the jump in log hospital admissions at age 
65, based on a specification of equation (8) that includes a quadratic in age, fully interacted with 
                                                 
30 The data sets exclude Veteran Administration hospitals.  For our analysis, we focus on patients admitted from 
home. 
31 We used the BRFSS data set (which has state identifiers) to estimate the rises in insurance coverage at age 65 for 
people in California and Florida only.  Overall, the rise is a little bigger in Florida (13 points) than California (10 
points).  Within either state, however, the patterns by ethnic group are very close to those reported in Table 3.  25
a dummy for age 65 or older.  We also show estimates of jumps in three characteristics of the 
hospital stays at each age: the mean duration of the stay (in days), the average amount charged 
by the hospital for the stay, and the fraction of admittees who died in the hospital.  Looking first 
at the models for the number of admissions (columns 1, 5, and 9), we estimate that the number of 
admissions rises by 6.0 percent at age 65 in California, 11.4 percent in Florida, and by 6.4 
percent nationwide.  Across the three major ethnic groups, the rise is largest for white non-
Hispanics, a little smaller for Hispanics, and negligible for black non-Hispanics.  The sampling 
errors are small enough that in both states we can reject the hypothesis that the rise in admissions 
is the same for blacks as the other two groups, although the rises for whites and Hispanics are 
insignificantly different. 
The results for length of stay and in-hospital mortality suggest that the hospital caseload 
becomes less sick at age 65, consistent with the notion that the extra admittees after 65 are 
relatively healthy.  As we show below, this is consistent with bigger increases at age 65 in non-
life-threatening diagnoses.  The patterns in the changes in duration and mortality by ethnic group 
are also generally consistent with this hypothesis.  Interestingly, average hospital charges do not 
change much in California but show a decline in Florida. 
The lower panel of Table 6 shows estimates of the number and characteristics of hospital 
stays, classified by route into the hospital (emergency room or not), and by whether the 
admission was for elective, urgent, or emergency care (which is only coded in the Florida data).  
In California, almost all the discontinuous growth in admissions at age 65 is driven by non-
emergency room admissions.  In Florida, there is some increase in both emergency room and 
non-ER admissions, but the percentage increase in non-ER admissions is nearly three times 
bigger.  When the data are classified by type of admission, the patterns reinforce the conclusion  26
that most of the rise in hospitalization at age 65 is attributable to an increase in discretionary 
medical care: the rise in elective care admissions is 19.1 percent versus 5.6 percent for 
emergency care admissions. 
As noted, the discharge files have no information on education, which is a key predictor 
of insurance coverage status prior to age 65.  As an alternative, we used geographic information 
in the Florida files to estimate the fraction of 50-64 year old admittees who were uninsured by 
zip code of residence.  (This is estimated as the fraction of all dischargees who paid their own 
bill, or were classified as indigent or charity care cases).  We then divided all zip codes in the 
state into four equally-sized groups, ranked by the fraction of 50-64 year olds without insurance.  
Figure 11 shows the age profiles in the number of admissions from the four zip code groups, 
while Table 7 shows estimates of the jumps at age 65 in the number and characteristics of 
admissions by group.  Contrary to the view that the rise in admissions at age 65 is driven by new 
inflows of people who previously lacked coverage, the jump in admissions is largest for 
residents of areas with highest rates of insurance before age 65, and smallest for residents of 
areas with the lowest rates of insurance prior to 65 (though the difference in the jump at 65 is not 
statistically significant).  The shifts in duration of stay is somewhat imprecisely estimated and 
not much different across the four zip code areas, while changes in in-hospital mortality rates are 
only observed for the two “low insurance” groups. 
As a final step in analyzing the discharge files, we tabulated the most common ICD-9 
codes assigned as reasons for admission among people ages 60-64, and the most common 
primary procedures performed during the hospital stay.  Figure 12 shows the age profiles for 6 of 
the most common admission diagnoses in California: chronic ischemic heart disease (IHD, often 
treated by bypass surgery), acute myocardial infarction (AMI or heart attack), heart failure,  27
chronic bronchitis, osteoarthrosis (degenerative joint disease, often treated by joint replacement), 
and pneumonia.  The figure reveals large discontinuous increases in admissions at age 65 for 
IHD and osteoarthrosis, smaller increases for AMI, chronic bronchitis and pneumonia and no 
increase for heart failure.  The estimation results in the upper panel of Table 8 confirm these 
impressions, revealing relatively large jumps at age 65 in admissions for IHD and osteoarthrosis 
in both California and Florida, and much smaller jumps for AMI and pneumonia.  The national 
estimates are roughly consistent with the state data, but are much less precisely estimated due to 
the smaller samples.  The rises in admission for AMI are potentially surprising, and suggest that 
a significant number of people under 65 who have heart attacks are either not treated or are 
treated on an outpatient basis.
32 
The results by type of procedure in the lower panel of Table 8 confirm the importance of 
discrete rises in admissions related to joint replacement surgery and heart bypass surgery at age 
65.  Rises in the number of discharges with joint replacements of the lower extremity (hip and 
knee replacements) parallel to the rises in admission for osteoarthrosis diagnoses.  Similarly, 
rises in removal of coronary artery obstruction and bypass anastomosis are comparable to the 
rise in admissions for IHD diagnoses.  Finally, it is interesting to note that the increase in 
admissions for people who receive no procedures is below the overall growth in admissions in 
both states (4.7% versus an overall average of 6.0% in California, 9.2% versus an overall 
average of 11.4% in Florida), but is above the overall growth in admissions nationwide (8.5% 
versus an overall average of 6.4%). 
                                                 
32 Another possibility is that once people become eligible for Medicare, hospitals assign different diagnoses codes 
for certain symptoms to increase their billings.  Some of this may arise because of a shift in caseloads across 
hospitals at age 65.  In particular, people over 65 are more likely to be admitted to private hospitals and less likely 
to be admitted to county hospitals.  28
Taken as a whole, the results from our analysis of hospital discharge records suggest that 
although reaching age 65 has an important effect on utilization of inpatient hospital services, the 
patterns by ethnicity, region, type of admission, and procedure all point to a causal mechanism 
other than insurance coverage per se.  The relatively larger increases in hospitalization after age 
65 for white non-Hispanics and residents of areas with the highest rates of insurance coverage 
among 50-64 year olds, and the very large rises for bypass surgery and joint replacement at 65, 
suggest to us that the changes are driven by features of the Medicare system, such as relatively 
generous coverage of hospital services, rather than to the fact that coverage rises at the Medicare 
age limit.  The effect may be more pronounced among relatively wealthy Medicare recipients 
because they can afford the out-of-pocket costs of surgery or have secondary insurance 
(Medigap or retiree health insurance) that reduces those costs.   
Interestingly, a recent panel of the National Institute of Health concluded that hip and 
knee replacement surgeries contribute significantly to quality of life and are under-performed in 
the U.S.  If true, this implies that the rise in admissions for these procedures at age 65 may be 
due to excessively stringent limitations in the insurance coverage available prior to age 65, rather 
than to overly generous Medicare reimbursement rates for these procedures. 
VI. Changes in Health-Related Behaviors 
As we noted in Table 1, insured and uninsured people differ in several important health 
related behaviors, including smoking, diet, and exercise.  In Table 9, we investigate whether 
there are any discrete changes in the age profiles of smoking, exercise, and weight outcomes at 
age 65, using data from the 1999-2002 BRFSS.
33   Increased access to routine medical care after 
                                                 
33 The smoking measure we use is whether an individual smokes daily.  Results for smoking at all are very similar.  
The exercise measure is “During the past month, did you participate in any physical activities or exercises such as 
running, calisthenics, golf, gardening or walking for exercise?”  29
age 65 may increase awareness of the health consequences of smoking, exercise, and weight, 
causing some people to change their behavior and creating a pathway  for Medicare eligibility to 
affect health. 
The age profiles for the probabilities of smoking, participating in exercise, and of being 
overweight (body mass index in excess of 25) or obese (body mass index in excess of 30) all 
follow relatively smooth downward trends between the ages of 50 and 80.  The estimates in 
Table 9 show that there are no large or statistically significant jumps in smoking or exercise 
participation.  There is some indication, however, of a rise in the probability of being overweight 
or obese for less educated minorities and for blacks.  These rises are noticeable in a graph, but 
appear to be driven by a downward dip among 63 and 64 year olds, rather than a systematic rise 
at age 65.  We therefore attribute the point estimates to misspecification of the age profiles 
and/or sampling error, rather than to Medicare eligibility. 
Overall, we conclude that health behaviors evolve smoothly with age, and do not change 
suddenly at 65.  In view of the extensive literature on habit persistence in smoking, eating, and 
other lifestyle choices this is perhaps unsurprising.  The implication is that health related 
behaviors are unlikely to be an important channel through which Medicare eligibility affects 
health or mortality at age 65. 
VII. Changes in Self-Reported Health 
In this section, we turn to an analysis of trends in self-reported health before and after age 
65.  At the outset it should be noted that even if Medicare eligibility leads to increased use of 
medical services, it is unclear how this will affect the age profiles of self-assessed health.  One 
possibility is that more preventative care and diagnostic testing leads to a shift in the rate of  30
change of true health status that translates to a shift in the rate of change of subjective health.
34  
Such a phenomenon can only be measured under stronger assumptions than the smoothness 
assumptions underlying equations (2) and (3).  In particular, identification of a causal effect on 
the derivative of health requires an assumption that the age profile of health of uninsured people 
has continuous first derivatives.
35  An alternative possibility is that improved access to care after 
age 65 leads to a discrete shift in self-assessed health.  The shift could be positive (if certain 
health problems can be resolved quickly, or if uncertainty about a chronic condition can be 
resolved) or negative (if there is a “labeling effect” as people are informed about previously 
unrecognized conditions, or if treatment causes serious side effects). 
Both the NHIS and the BRFSS ask individuals to give an assessment of their own health 
on a 5-point scale: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor.
36  Figure 13 shows the age profiles 
of the fraction of the population who report themselves to be in good, very good, or excellent 
health, based on pooled 1992-2001 NHIS samples.  Inspection of the graphs shows that health is 
generally declining with age.  The rate of decline before age 65 for less educated minorities is a 
little faster than for the overall population, implying that the SES gradient in health is widening 
with age (Case and Deaton, 2003).  Some time in the mid-60s the profile for less educated 
minorities gradually flattens, and between 65 and 75 there is some convergence in health 
between less educated minorities and the overall population.  While this is consistent with a 
causal effect of insurance coverage on the rate of change of health, it is clearly impossible to 
                                                 
34 Baker et al. (2001) analyzed data from the Health and Retirement Survey and concluded that lack of insurance 
contributed to an increased risk of health declines among 51-61 year olds. 
35 More precisely, consider two assumptions: (i) equation (1) includes an interaction between age and coverage 
status  λj(a)×Cija ; (ii) the age functions fj(a) in the structural outcome equation and g
C
j(a) in the first stage 
coverage equation have continuous first derivatives.  In this case the reduced form outcome equation includes a 
term like λj(a)Da (an interaction of an age function with the dummy for age 65 or older), and any discrete change 
in the first derivative of the reduced form profile at age 65 is interpretable as a causal effect of coverage. 
36 There is an extensive literature on the reliability and interpretation of self-reported health, including Bound 
(1991), Waidman et al. (1995), and Crossley and Kennedy (2002).  31
pinpoint the precise turning point in the rate of change of health of less educated minorities.  
Given the quarter-to-quarter variability in the age profiles, it is also hard to discern whether there 
is a discrete shift in the level of self-assessed health at 65.  Similar features are evident in a graph 
of the age profiles of the assessment of health (assigning 1 to poor health and 5 to excellent). 
Table 10 presents a series of estimates of the jump in self-assessed health at age 65.  The 
first column presents estimates from linear probability models for the event that people report 
their health as good or better.  The second and third columns presents estimates from models for 
the mean assessment of health (rated 1 to 5): column 2 reports estimates from a simple linear 
regression, while column 3 presents estimates from an ordered probit model.
37  Although the 
estimates are somewhat imprecise, the pattern across subgroups is similar across specifications 
and consistent with a causal link from insurance coverage to self-assessed health.  For example, 
the jumps are relatively large for less educated minorities and Hispanics and relatively small for 
whites and better educated subgroups.  The estimated effects from the ordered probit model, for 
example, suggest that the mean assessment of less educated minorities and Hispanics increases 
by about one-tenth of a category at age 65 – equivalent to closing about 15% of the gap in mean 
assessments between the overall population and either subgroup. 
VIII. Trends in Mortality 
In this section, we analyze trends in mortality before and after age 65.  The previous 
sections have documented that Medicare eligibility leads to significant increases in access to and 
use of medical services.  This could change the probability of dying in two ways.  For acute, life 
threatening conditions, it is possible that improved access to hospital care reduces the probability 
of dying immediately after becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65.  For non-acute conditions, 
                                                 
37 The estimates in columns 2 and 3 are multiplied by 100.  A coefficient of 10 implies that the mean assessment 
rises by .1 (or one tenth of a category).  32
improved access to care might increase the life expectancy of individuals who would not have 
died immediately in the absence of Medicare. 
We begin by testing for a discrete change in mortality rates at age 65 using a regression 
discontinuity design.  We then tackle the more complicated problem of testing for less immediate 
changes in mortality rates resulting from Medicare coverage.  We implement two approaches to 
estimating the long-term effects of Medicare coverage.  First, we compare projected mortality 
rates among 66 and 67 year olds with the actual rates.  Second, we look for comparison groups 
not exposed to Medicare whose mortality rates may serve as a plausible counterfactual.  In our 
first comparison, we consider mortality rates in the five years before and after Medicare was 
implemented in 1966.
38  The second comparison we make is between Canada and the United 
States during the time period 1990-1995.  While informative, these two comparisons suffer from 
several limitations that are detailed below. 
To test for the possibility of a discrete reduction in mortality at age 65, we construct age-
specific death rates by gender, race and ethnicity.
39  In the numerator, we use the number of 
deaths at each age listed in the Multiple Cause of Death file from the US Department of Health 
Services National Center for Health Statistics.  In the denominator, we use postcensal estimates 
of the mid-year resident population of the United States by single year of age.  Although the 
denominator is a simple characterization of the population’s exposure to the risk of dying (i.e., 
period person-years lived), we have experimented with more sophisticated estimates of exposure 
based on different assumptions about the timing of deaths and found these to make little 
                                                 
38 Although Medicare was enacted on July 30, 1965, it was not implemented until July 1, 1966. 
39 We depart from our earlier approach of looking at race-education groups.  Although educational attainment has 
been reported on the death certificate since 1989, there is evidence of severe misreporting of education, especially 
at older ages (Sorlie, 1996).  33
difference.  In order to get more precise estimates, we pool deaths over the period 1989-1998 and 
sum mid-year population estimates over the same period. 
In Figure 14, we plot the age profiles of death rates by gender and race/ethnicity.  There 
is no evidence of a discontinuous change in mortality at age 65 for any of the six subgroups.  In 
the first row of Table 11 we present the corresponding regression discontinuity estimates, based 
on a specification that includes a cubic polynomial in age, fully interacted with an age 65 
dummy.  Consistent with the patterns in Figure 14, there is no evidence of a shift in mortality  at 
age 65 for any of the groups.  All of the point estimates are insignificant and all but one are 
positive --  the opposite of what would be expected if insurance coverage causes an 
instantaneous reduction in mortality.
40   
For most conditions, if Medicare has an impact on 65 year olds, it will increase the life 
expectancy of those not at immediate risk of dying.  This is much harder to detect than an 
immediate, discrete change in mortality because death rates will change slowly over time as 
deaths are shifted from earlier to later ages throughout the age distribution.  We begin by 
examining the possibility that Medicare may slow the rate of increase in mortality rates by 
comparing the actual mortality rates among 66 and 67 year olds with those predicted by fitting a 
cubic polynomial to the mortality rates of 50 to 64 year olds.  The actual and predicted mortality 
experience of 66 year olds is presented in rows 3 and 4 of Table 11.  For all but one sub sample, 
the actual mortality rate of 66 year olds is slightly higher than the predicted rate (consistent with 
small but positive estimates of the jump in mortality rates at age 65).  As can be seen in the 
bottom two rows of the table, the same is true for 67 year olds, though the gap between actual 
                                                 
40 We ran similar regression for the 6 most common causes of death and found no evidence of a discontinuous 
reduction in mortality rates for any of the 6 causes.  The top 6 causes and their associated three digit ICD-9 CM 
codes (in parentheses) are: ischemic heart disease (410-414), lung cancer (162), chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (490-496), cerebrovascular disease (430-438), diabetes (250), and pneumonia (480-496).  34
and predicted mortality is typically a little larger.
41  These results provide no evidence that 
Medicare coverage leads to a discrete reduction in mortality at ages 66 and 67, and point instead 
toward the difficulty of predicting the age profiles of mortality from the death rates of younger 
people.
42 
As an alternate and perhaps more straightforward way of examining the changes in 
mortality rates, we examine the age profile in the year-to-year percent changes in the mortality 
rate.  In Figure 15, we see that there is no evidence of a deceleration in the mortality rate at age 
65.  This result stands in sharp contrast to findings reported by Lichtenberg (2001), who uses 
life-table death probabilities constructed by the Social Security Administration and finds a short-
term reduction in the growth rate of mortality between ages 65 and 69.  The SSA life tables are 
primarily intended for use in projecting the long-term survival rates of the US population and are 
generally not suitable for examining changes in the derivative of mortality rates.  In particular, 
two methodological issues make the SSA life tables unsuitable for this type of analysis.  First, 
SSA uses Vital Statistics and Census data to construct death probabilities before age 65, but 
switches to using death data from the Medicare program after age 65.
43  If the slope of the 
mortality profile at 65 happens to differ somewhat between the two data series, then splicing 
them together will lead to a spurious change in the first derivative at exactly age 65.  Second, 
SSA uses osculatory interpolation to produce smoothly trending estimates within five-year age 
groups.  In order to prevent discontinuities at the seams between age groups, this method forces 
the first derivatives of the interpolated series to be equal at the seams between age groups (seams 
                                                 
41 The differences between actual and predicted mortality rates become more pronounced at older ages as we project 
further out-of-sample from age 64.  Basing the projections on higher order polynomials does not solve this 
problem. 
42 One obvious issue is the presence of cohort effects, which would confound the extrapolation exercise. 
43 The methodology used by SSA is described, in detail, in Bell et al. (1992).  35
occur at 60, 65, 70, etc.), making it appear as if the derivative changes smoothly across the 
seams, and thus obscuring any spurious changes in the derivative caused by the change of data 
series.
44  More generally, interpolated data pose a problem for research designs based on the 
occurrence of discontinuities since interpolation is designed to smooth out such irregularities, 
even when they are real. 
Due to the difficulties in estimating mortality rates for older people from the age profiles 
for younger people, we turn to an alternative based on plausible comparison groups.  In Figure 
16, we compare mortality rates for 50-to-80 year olds in the five years before and after Medicare 
was implemented in 1966.  We do not see a discernable pre-post difference in mortality for men.  
For women we see a significant reduction in mortality rates in the later period.  However, the 
reductions occur for women as young as 62, suggesting that the declining mortality rates are the 
result of technological improvements or cohort differences rather than Medicare.  There are two 
obvious limitations with the simple comparisons in Figure 16.  First, since the mortality rates are 
typically decreasing over time it is possible that small improvements due to Medicare may be 
hidden by the greater improvements due to other causes.  Second, this particular comparison is 
limited in its ability to pick up the impact of Medicare because older people in the post-1965 
sample have only been exposed to a few years of Medicare coverage. 
To sidestep this problem we compare mortality rates in the United States and Canada.  
Canada is a plausible counterfactual since although the two countries are generally similar, 
Canadians have universal health insurance coverage at all ages.  Canadian death rates are lower 
than those in the U.S., however, so some adjustment is needed to predict the profile of U.S. rates 
in the absence of Medicare.  After some experimentation, we found that U.S. death rates before 
                                                 
44 For an overview of osculatory interpolation, see Shyrock and Siegel (1980), pp. 694-702 or Smith (1992), pp. 27-
34.  36
65 are quite similar to those of Canadians 2 years older.  Figure 17 therefore shows U.S. 
mortality rates by gender, along with Canadian rates that have been shifted left by 2 years.
45  Use 
of the adjusted Canadian death rates as a counterfactual shows no evidence of a discrete change 
in US death rates at age 65 for either men or women, although it should be noted that age-
adjusted Canadian profiles do not perfectly track the US profiles between the ages of 50 and 64, 
so this comparison is unlikely to reveal small changes in mortality rates associated with 
Medicare eligibility. 
Although our results suggest that Medicare has little impact on mortality rates, either at 
age 65 or over the longer run, we believe they should be interpreted with caution.  The mortality 
rates we have examined are for large groups, and it is quite possible that there are effects for 
subgroups that are masked by the aggregation.  This is a particular problem because the increases 
in access to care documented earlier in the paper affect only a small fraction of the population.  
The precision of our comparisons is limited by the difficulty of obtaining precise estimates of 
mortality patterns in the absence of Medicare.  It is thus unlikely that our methods could detect 
anything other than a very large effect. 
IX. Summary of Patterns Across Groups 
To summarize our findings, Table 12 presents estimates of equation (5), relating the 
estimated reduced form effects of reaching age 65 across different subgroups to the estimated 
rise in net health insurance coverage at age 65 for each subgroup.  We estimate the models 
across 7 subgroups: 3 ethnicity groups and 4 ethnicity/education groups.
46  Each row of the table 
corresponds to a different outcome.  For example, row 1 shows the relationship between the 
                                                 
45 The death rates for these comparisons come from the Human Mortality Database at UC Berkeley.  We also tried 
raising the Canadian mortality rates at each age so that the rates among 60-64 year olds matched, but this resulted 
in a very poor fit among 50-60 year olds. 
46 The groups are not mutually exclusive so the standard errors are understated.  The model should be estimated by 
generalized least squares using the inverse covariance matrix between the 7 estimates as a weighting matrix.  37
changes in the probability of delaying medical care at any time in the past year to the changes in 
insurance coverage.  The coefficient estimates reported in column 1 correspond to estimates of 
the coefficient d1 in equation (5).  Under the assumption of a constant causal effect of coverage, 
this is an estimate of δ (the causal effect of insurance coverage).  Column 2 reports the R-squared 
coefficients for the equations.  As noted in our earlier discussion, these should be relatively high 
if the discontinuity of the outcome variable at age 65 is solely attributable to the rise in insurance 
coverage.  Column 3 shows the mean gap in the outcome at ages 63-64 between more educated 
whites and less educated minorities: this is a simple summary of the SES gradient for the 
outcome among the near-elderly population.  Finally column 4 shows the estimated fraction of 
this gap that is closed after the availability of Medicare, estimated by multiplying the estimate of 
d1 by 13.54% (the estimated relative jump in coverage from column 3 of Table 3). 
Looking first at the three self-reported measures of access, the relative sizes of the jumps 
in access across subgroups are systematically correlated with the jumps in coverage.  Reaching 
the Medicare eligibility age is estimated to close 40-80 percent of the inter-group disparity in the 
three measures.  The same conclusion holds with respect to the probability of a doctor visit in the 
past year: 84 percent of the variation across groups is attributable to differential rises in 
insurance coverage, and over 100% of the inter-group gap among 63-64 year olds is closed after 
65.  This contrasts sharply with the estimated changes in the probability of a hospital stay, which 
are essentially unrelated to the increase in insurance coverage. 
Results for the four preventative care outcomes – flu shot in the past year, cholesterol test 
in the past 2 years, mammogram in the past 2 years, and prostate test in the past 2 years – are 
weaker.  Variation in the size of the discontinuities in these outcomes at age 65 is not very highly 
correlated with the discontinuities in insurance coverage, but the point estimates of the  38
coefficients in column 1 suggest eligibility for Medicare would be expected to close 15-30 
percent of the SES gradient in preventative care. 
Finally, the last row of the table looks at self-reported health.  The estimated jumps in 
health at age 65 (from the ordered probit specification in Table 9) are reasonably highly 
correlated with the corresponding jumps in insurance coverage, with an R-squared coefficient of 
0.66.  Although Medicare eligibility is estimated to have a narrowing effect on inter-group 
disparities in health, the predicted effect is to close only about 12 percent of the gap among the 
near-elderly. 
X. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use the discrete changes in health insurance coverage at age 65 
generated by the rules of the Medicare program to identify the impact of health insurance 
coverage on health related behaviors and health outcomes.  Medicare eligibility is associated 
with a sharp increase in average coverage rates at age 65  and a narrowing in coverage disparities 
across different groups in the U.S. population.  Variation in the relative impact of the program 
provides a way to test that it is health insurance coverage per se that is responsible for the 
changes in health care utilization and health that occur at age 65, rather than other features such 
as the relative generosity of Medicare reimbursement schedules. 
Our estimates show that insurance coverage has a significant causal effect on self-
reported access to health care and on health care utilization.  Race and education groups that 
experience the largest gains in insurance coverage at age 65 experience large reductions in the 
probability of delaying or not receiving medical care, and relative increases in the probability of 
an annual doctor visit.  Evidence for an impact of insurance coverage on medical screenings and 
preventive care is less clear-cut, although this is partly a reflection of data limitations.  We also  39
find large and precisely estimated increases in hospital admissions at age 65, with the biggest 
increases for discretionary procedures like hip and knee replacements and bypass surgeries.  
Unlike doctor visits, the rise in hospital admissions tends to be larger for groups with higher 
insurance coverage prior to age 65.  Thus, the roughly 10 percent rise in hospitalization rates 
between 64 and 65 year olds appears to be a result of differences between Medicare and private 
insurance coverage, rather than of the rise in insurance coverage at age 65. 
The impact of Medicare eligibility on health outcomes is harder to assess, both because 
of difficulties in measuring health, and because health is less likely to change discretely in 
response to insurance coverage.  Perhaps surprisingly, we find a statistically significant impact 
of reaching age 65 on self-reported health, with the largest gains among the education and race 
groups that experience the largest increases in insurance coverage at age 65.  On the other hand, 
we find no evidence of a discrete change in mortality rates at 65, nor do we see any shift in the 
rate of growth of mortality after 65.  These findings have to interpreted cautiously since it is 
difficult to identify a plausible comparison group for post-65 mortality rates in the absence of 
Medicare.  Taken as a whole, we believe our findings point to a significant but relatively modest 
impact of health insurance coverage on health. 
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Canada Males (Shift Age)
Canada Females (Shift Age)Table 1: Characteristics of People Age 62-64 With and Without Health Insurance
Subsample Subsample
Overall With    Without
Sample Insurance Insurance      T-ratio
Have Health Insurance 90.1 100.0 0.0           --
Female 51.8 51.2 58.3 4.60
Married 72.6 74.2 58.0 10.65
Working 40.9 41.2 38.4 1.80
Poor (Family Income<Pov. Line) 7.1 5.8 19.3 11.37
White Non-Hispanic 81.1 83.1 62.6 13.94
Black Non-Hispanic 8.9 8.4 13.3 4.69
Hispanic 7.0 5.7 19.1 11.39
Other Race Non-Hispanic 3.0 2.8 5.0 3.30
High School Dropout 24.2 21.3 50.8 19.26
High School, No College 35.0 35.8 28.4 5.21
Some College 20.7 21.6 13.1 7.82
4 Years College or More 20.0 21.4 7.7 15.19
Daily Smoker 14 13.2 20.5
Any Exercise in Past 30 Days 70.2 71.5 60.9 9.49
Overweight (BMI over 25.0) 67.6 67.4 69.2 1.19
Obese (BMI over 30) 25.1 24.7 28.0 2.13
Have a Usual Place of Preventative Care 94.2 96.3 74.6 11.59
Delayed Care Last Year for Cost Reasons 7.1 4.8 28.1 17.44
Saw Doctor At Least Once Last Year 84.4 86.6 65.7 15.42
Had Routine Checkup Last Year 81.6 84.1 62.3 8.81
Overnight Stay in Hospital Last Year 11.3 11.7 7.5 6.22
Had Flu Shot Last Year 46.6 48.7 31.4 9.88
Ever Had Pneumonia Shot 28.6 29.5 21.7 5.10
Had Cholesterol Check in Last 2 Years 83.1 85.8 61.6 10.38
Had Mammogram in Last 2 Years 80.5 84.1 56.6 12.09
Had Pap Smear in Last 2 Years 71.9 74.5 55.1 8.34
Had Clinical Breast Exam in Last 2 Years 78.7 81.6 59.7 9.57
Had Prostate-Specific Antigen Test in Last 2 Yrs 69.4 72.0 46.9 6.64
Had Digital Rectal Prostate Exam in Last 2 Years 69.4 72.1 45.9 7.06
Ever Diagnosed with Hypertension 45.5 46.1 40.9 2.37
Ever Diagnosed with Diabetes 14.4 14.4 15.1 0.44
Ever Diagnosed with Heart-Related Problems 19.0 19.6 14.0 3.63
In Good, Very Good, Excellent Health 79.4 79.9 74.1 4.24
Notes: Except as noted, means are based on data from pooled 1997-2001 NHIS.  Percent who saw a doctor in past year and percent with a 
hospital stay in past year come from pooled 1992-2001 NHIS.  Percent with a routine doctor visit, cholesterol test, mammogram, pap smear, 
clinical breast exam, PSA test, digital rectal test, any exercise in past month, overweight, and obese are based on data from pooled 1998-2002 
BRFSS.   Heart-Related Problems include coronary heart disease, angina pectoris, and "any [other] kind of heart condition or heart disease".Table 2:  Differences in Health Care Access/Utilization by Group and Insurance Status (62-64 Year Olds)
  Delayed Care for Cost    Had Mammogram       Had Cholesterol
   Percent    Reasons Last Year:  Saw Doctor Last Year:  Hosp. Stay Last Year:      in Past 2 Years:     Test in Past 2 Years: 
   Insured    Ins.    Unins.  T-ratio    Ins.    Unins.  T-ratio    Ins.    Unins.  T-ratio    Ins.    Unins.  T-ratio    Ins.    Unins.  T-ratio
      (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)    (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)    (10)    (11)    (12)    (13)    (14)    (15)    (16)
All 90.1 4.8 28.1 17.4 86.6 65.7 15.4 11.7 7.5 6.2 84.1 56.6 12.1 85.8 61.6 10.4
High Education 94.4 4.1 30.1 10.2 87.3 67.6 8.9 10.6 7.7 2.5 84.8 55.2 10.7 87.3 64.9 7.8
 White Nonhispanic
Low Education 83.6 7.1 30.7 7.4 84.7 61.8 7.9 15.2 7.0 5.8 74.2 47.4 6.0 78.9 45.3 6.2
 White Nonhispanic
High Education 88.1 4.2 26.0 6.4 85.6 68.5 4.8 10.7 4.7 3.9 89.8 69.1 3.4 86.3 60.7 4.0
 Minority
Low Education 71.4 7.7 26.3 8.2 85.7 65.7 7.6 15.4 9.1 4.1 77.4 57.9 2.7 78.5 65.6 1.9
 Minority
Note: See note to Table 1.  Entries under "Ins." columns are means for subgroup with health insurance.  Entries under "Unins." column are means for subgroup without insurance.  
High education refers to high school diploma or more.  Minority refers to Hispanics, blacks, and members of other non-white racial groups.Table 3:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Change in Health Insurance Coverage at Age 65
Model fit to                  Models fit to Micro Data: Linear Prob.
Aggregrated Linear Prob. Linear Prob.    Probit    Model for
   Age Cells  no controls w/ controls w/ controls   Medicare
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)
All 8.41 8.41 8.60 6.05 67.32
(0.30)            (0.26)            (0.24)            (0.20)            (1.49)           
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education 5.28 5.28 5.28 3.95 72.59
 White Nonhispanic (0.34)            (0.26)            (0.27)            (0.32)            (1.41)           
Low Education 14.21 14.21 14.43 10.86 63.26
 White Nonhispanic (1.08)            (1.42)            (1.38)            (1.21)            (1.42)           
High Education 9.03 9.03 9.13 8.92 57.80
 Minority (1.47)            (1.15)            (1.13)            (1.05)            (2.53)           
Low Education 18.83 18.83 19.41 15.93 48.70
 Minority (1.73)            (1.63)            (1.56)            (1.87)            (3.03)           
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics 7.26 7.26 7.30 5.10 70.56
(0.31)            (0.28)            (0.24)            (0.27)            (1.32)           
Black Non-Hispanics 13.64 13.64 14.19 12.27 55.14
(1.53)            (1.12)            (1.08)            (1.33)            (3.10)           
Hispanics 17.30 17.30 16.88 14.25 51.87
(2.16)            (2.02)            (1.93)            (1.77)            (2.84)           
By Gender:
Men 7.19 7.19 7.32 5.34 65.40
(0.51)            (0.54)            (0.51)            (0.40)            (1.24)           
Women 9.50 9.50 9.75 6.67 69.03
(0.49)            (0.60)            (0.57)            (0.43)            (1.88)           
Note: Table entries represent estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models
for the probability of insurance coverage (columns 1-4) or Medicare coverage (column 5).   All models include 
quadratic in age (in quarters) fully interacted with dummy for age 65 or older.  Models in columns (2)-(5) are
fit to micro data: standard errors are calculated assuming a cluster structure by age.  
Controls in models in columns (3)-(5) include year dummies, and dummies for gender, ethnicity,
education levels, and region.  Probit estimates are dummy for age 65 x density at mean.  Standard errors in  
parentheses. Table 4:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Reaching Age 65 on Health Care Access and Utilization
Needed to 
    Delayed Did Not Get See Dr. Last  Has Usual Saw Doctor Spent 1 or
Care Last  Care Last  Year, Didn't   Place for at Least  More Nights
Year for Cost Year for Cost Because of Preventative Once Last in Hospital
   Reasons    Reasons      Cost      Care     Year    Last Year
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)
All -0.56 -0.23 -2.70 1.40 0.97 1.18
(0.64)          (0.52)          (0.56)          (0.86)          (0.68)          (0.59)         
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education 0.31 0.21 -1.76 0.36 0.16 1.07
 White Nonhispanic (0.83)          (0.46)          (0.47)          (1.18)          (0.93)          (0.72)         
Low Education -1.12 0.20 -4.60 3.88 1.79 0.95
 White Nonhispanic (1.40)          (1.65)          (1.95)          (2.46)          (1.34)          (1.58)         
High Education -1.77 -0.60 -3.54 3.74 -0.22 2.11
 Minority (1.61)          (1.19)          (1.36)          (1.53)          (1.91)          (1.15)         
Low Education -5.06 -4.39 -8.90 0.99 5.63 1.09
 Minority (2.02)          (1.41)          (2.42)          (2.04)          (2.06)          (1.93)         
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics 0.01 0.27 -2.01 1.07 0.59 1.06
(0.74)          (0.55)          (0.57)          (0.94)          (0.72)          (0.69)         
Black Non-Hispanics -4.17 -2.51 -5.45 4.42 2.82 1.49
(1.82)          (1.72)          (2.07)          (1.10)          (1.64)          (1.41)         
Hispanics -5.02 -4.78 -10.21 3.35 6.35 2.56
(1.36)          (0.99)          (3.16)          (2.29)          (2.25)          (1.95)         
By Gender:
Men -1.17 -0.90 -1.66 1.95 0.88 2.21
(1.03)          (0.74)          (0.63)          (1.20)          (0.85)          (0.94)         
Women 0.01 0.39 -3.42 0.93 0.97 0.29
(0.85)          (0.69)          (0.92)          (0.82)          (1.18)          (0.65)         
Note: Table entries represent estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models for outcome listed in column
heading.  All models fit to micro data; standard errors (in paretheses) are estimated assuming a cluster structure by age.
Models include quadratic in age, fully interacted with a dummy for age 65 or older, along with sample year dummies and
dummies for gender, ethnicity, region, and education levels.  Models in columns (1), (2), and (4) are fit to data from pooled
1997-2001 NHIS.  Models in columns (5) and (6) are fit to data from pooled 1992-2001 NHIS. Models in column (3) 
are fit to data from 1998-2002 BRFSS.Table 5:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Reaching Age 65 on Preventative Care
Had Blood Had PSA or      Ever 
   Had Flu Cholesterol Mammogram Rectal Exam   Ever Had Diagnosed
 Shot in Past Checked in      in Past   Ever Had     in Past    PSA or        with
       Year Past 2 Yrs      2 Yrs Mammogram      2 Yrs Rectal Exam Hypertension
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)         (7)
All 1.03 1.45 1.02 -0.18 1.08 0.21 0.66
(1.03)          (0.64)          (0.82)          (0.58)          (1.64)          (1.07)          (1.85)         
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education 0.74 0.40 1.86 0.58 1.00 -0.01 -1.66
 White Nonhispanic (1.23)          (0.93)          (0.97)          (0.69)          (1.42)          (1.10)          (2.42)         
Low Education 4.91 9.99 0.02 -2.72 -3.56 -3.43 2.78
 White Nonhispanic (1.15)          (1.74)          (2.75)          (2.15)          (5.12)          (3.43)          (3.59)         
High Education -0.32 0.57 -4.42 -2.33 4.85 3.58 9.15
 Minority (2.70)          (2.23)          (2.30)          (1.25)          (2.26)          (1.54)          (3.96)         
Low Education 2.32 3.73 5.83 0.56 4.49 0.90 3.34
 Minority (3.11)          (2.31)          (2.55)          (1.43)          (5.20)          (4.37)          (5.19)         
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics 1.14 1.46 1.56 0.12 0.30 -0.46 -0.78
(1.10)          (0.86)          (0.92)          (0.67)          (1.64)          (1.05)          (1.93)         
Black Non-Hispanics -2.04 -0.75 2.70 2.60 -0.71 0.29 7.93
(2.56)          (1.74)          (2.19)          (1.57)          (3.77)          (3.51)          (4.00)         
Hispanics 2.55 0.13 -3.18 -5.40 12.73 4.67 5.02
(3.06)          (3.14)          (3.44)          (2.02)          (4.85)          (3.37)          (1.13)         
By Gender:
Men -0.56 2.63          --          --          --          -- 0.85
(1.19)          (1.22)          (2.85)         
Women 2.12 0.58          --          --          --          -- 0.45
(1.43)          (0.69)          (2.10)         
Note: Table entries represent estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models for outcome listed in column heading.  All models
fit to micro data; standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated assuming a cluster structure by age.  Models include quadratic in age, fully
interacted with a dummy for age 65 or older, along with sample year dummies and dummies for gender, ethnicity, region, and education
levels.  Models in columns (1)-(6) are fit to data from 1998-2002 BRFSS.  Models in column (7) are fit to data from 1997-2001 NHIS.Table 6:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Medicare Eligibility on Number and Characteristics of Hospital Discharges
                                     California                                                                       Florida                                
Log (No.   Days in     Total In-Hospital Log (No.   Days in     Total In-Hospital Log (No.   Days in  In-Hospital
Discharges)  Hospital  Charges  Mortality Discharges)  Hospital  Charges  Mortality Discharges)  Hospital  Mortality
   (x100)    (x100)   (dollars)    (x100)    (x100)    (x100)   (dollars)    (x100)    (x100)    (x100)    (x100)
      (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)       (7)       (8)       (9)       (10)       (11)
All 6.0 -6.5 -32.3 -0.18 11.4 -15.2 -182.8 -0.32 6.4 -4.8 0.04
(1.0) (2.1) (147.6) (0.06) (1.1) (2.0) (78.7) (0.06) (1.3) (10.3) (0.32)
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanic 7.1 -3.3 59.0 -0.14 13.4 -14.3 -125.0 -0.25 5.4 -20.9 -0.28
(1.2) (2.8) (184.0) (0.07) (1.7) (1.9) (99.4) (0.06) (1.6) (12.8) (0.34)
Black Non-Hispanic -0.7 -11.2 -131.0 -0.23 -0.3 -13.7 -64.7 -0.52 1.5 13.9 0.82
(2.4) (5.6) (308.6) (0.20) (2.0) (6.8) (265.7) (0.19) (3.1) (40.1) (0.81)
Hispanics 5.1 -10.3 -306.2 -0.18 10.8 -17.1 -776.2 -0.43
(1.4) (3.9) (282.6) (0.13) (1.5) (7.7) (300.0) (0.16)
By Route into Hospital:
Emergency Room (ER) 1.3 -14.5 -329.9 -0.16 6.0 -20.5 -481.0 -0.33
(0.1) (2.7) (194.9) (0.08) (1.3) (2.4) (143.4) (0.10)
Non-ER 10.8 2.2 132.9 -0.08 16.9 -9.3 -14.7 -0.20
(1.0) (3.0) (261.0) (0.05) (1.3) (3.0) (136.9) (0.08)
By Type of Admission:
Elective 19.1 -15.7 -114.4 -0.12
(1.4) (3.6) (143.6) (0.07)
Urgent 12.8 -9.6 -225.1 -0.29
(1.2) (5.7) (215.1) (0.09)
Emergency 5.6 -15.6 -337.0 -0.30
(1.3) (3.0) (183.0) (0.12)
U.S.
Note: For California and Florida, samples include people admitted to hospitals from home, discharged between 1995 and 1999 (California) or between 1995 and 
2000 (Florida). Data for the U.S. come from the 1979-1999 National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) Multi-Year File and are for 1995-1999. NHDS collects data 
on race, but not ethnicity. It also does not collect data about route into the hospital or type of admission. Models are fit to age cells, and include a quadratic for age (in 
years) fully interacted with a dummy for age 65 and older.  Standard errors in parentheses.Table 7:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Medicare Eligibility on Number and 
               Characteristics of Hospital Discharges, By Insurance Coverage Level of 
               Non-elderly Adults in Zip Code (Florida)
Log (No.   Days in     Total In-Hospital
Discharges)  Hospital  Charges  Mortality
   (x100)    (x100)   (dollars)    (x100)
      (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)
All 11.4 -15.2 -182.8 -0.32
(1.1) (2.0) (78.7) (0.06)
By Mean Fraction Uninsured in Zip Code
8.6% or Less Uninsured 12.4 -18.3 -314.0 -0.12
(1.8) (4.1) (141.7) (0.12)
8.6-11.2% Uninsured 12.0 -11.4 181.7 -0.17
(1.6) (3.7) (181.7) (0.11)
11.2-14.8% Uninsured 10.2 -16.6 -428.7 -0.47
(1.1) (3.3) (157.8) (0.10)
14.8% or More Uninsured 10.5 -21.1 -252.7 -0.44
(1.1) (6.0) (241.0) (0.14)
Note: Samples include people admitted to hospitals from home, discharged between 1995 and 2000.  
Models are fit to age cells, and include a quadratic for age (in years) fully interacted with a dummy for 
age 65 and older.   Average insurance rates in zip code are computed from discharge records for 
people age 50 to 64.  Fraction uninsured is the fraction who are coded as paying their own bill or 
covered by charity care or indigent care programs.Table 8:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Medicare Eligibility on Number of Hospital
               Discharges, By Admission Diagnoses and Procedures Performed in Hospital
       
California    Florida U.S.
      (1)       (2)      (3)
All 6.0 11.4 6.4
(1.0) (1.1) (1.3)
By Admission Diagnoses:
Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease 12.5 19.3 6.4
(2.1) (2.5) (5.6)
Acute Myocardial Infarction 5.4 7.2 5.1
(1.8) (2.8) (5.0)
Heart Failure 0.4 1.4 10.7
(2.4) (1.9) (7.8)
Chronic Bronchitis 7.3 10.5 8.5
(3.0) (3.2) (6.9)
Osteoarthrosis 15.3 34.9 14.9
(2.7) (3.0) (8.0)
Pneumonia 4.3 0.8 -2.3
(1.9) (1.4) (5.6)
By Procedure Performed in Hospital:
None 4.7 9.2 8.5
(1.3) (1.2) (1.6)
Diagnostic Procedures on Heart 7.4 11.3 -0.7
(1.9) (2.6) (6.4)
Removal of Coronary Artery Obstruction 11.3 17.7 7.0
(2.4) (3.2) (6.0)
Bypass Anastomosis of Heart 19.4 19.5 11.3
(2.1) (3.0) (7.2)
Joint Replacement of Lower Extremity 14.1 30.3 7.5
(2.2) (2.4) (7.1)
Diagnostic Procedures on Small Intestine 6.3 8.2 6.1
(2.3) (2.4) (9.1)
Cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) 20.4 20.7 16.4
(2.0) (3.4) (6.5)
Note: See note to Table 6.
Log (Number of Hospital Discharges) x 100:Table 9:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Reaching Age 65 on Smoking, Exercise
               and Body Weight
  Strenuous
      Smoke  Exercise in
        Daily Past 30 Days  Overweight      Obese
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)
All 0.42 -0.18 -0.53 0.86
(0.55)          (0.49)          (0.65)          (0.59)         
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education 0.83 -0.51 -0.94 0.08
 White Nonhispanic (0.63)          (0.50)          (0.89)          (0.73)         
Low Education -3.92 2.91 0.00 2.70
 White Nonhispanic (2.36)          (2.90)          (1.40)          (1.54)         
High Education 1.53 -0.55 -1.83 0.90
 Minority (1.35)          (2.11)          (2.45)          (1.48)         
Low Education -0.64 1.59 6.35 7.18
 Minority (1.70)          (2.60)          (2.01)          (1.69)         
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics 0.31 -0.22 -0.87 0.39
(0.78)          (0.53)          (0.74)          (0.69)         
Black Non-Hispanics 0.78 -0.36 3.20 6.15
(2.48)          (2.78)          (3.22)          (2.81)         
Hispanics -1.62 -1.39 -0.53 -0.33
(1.23)          (2.99)          (2.55)          (2.34)         
By Gender:
Men 0.23 0.69 -0.09 2.09
(0.86)          (1.03)          (0.56)          (0.64)         
Women 0.52 -0.98 -0.84 -0.09
(0.86)          (1.13)          (0.91)          (0.77)         
Note: Table entries represent estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models for
outcome listed in column heading.  See note to Table 4 for specification.  Models are estimated
using data from the 1999-2002 BRFSS.Table 10:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Reaching Age 65 on Self-Reported
                 Health
      Linear        Models for Level of Health 
  Probability Model (5 point scale 1=poor 5=excellent)
  for Good or      Linear    Ordered
Better Health Regression       Probit
        (1)         (2)         (3)
All 0.21 2.06 2.13
(0.87)          (1.81)          (1.69)         
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education -0.34 0.59 0.83
 White Nonhispanic (0.70)          (2.07)          (2.01)         
Low Education 1.96 6.81 6.17
 White Nonhispanic (2.04)          (3.60)          (3.22)         
High Education -1.53 -2.00 -2.00
 Minority (2.20)          (7.05)          (6.70)         
Low Education 3.97 9.93 9.49
 Minority (2.21)          (4.92)          (4.47)         
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics 0.10 1.85 1.96
(0.80)          (1.80)          (1.70)         
Black Non-Hispanics -0.42 2.31 2.49
(2.50)          (7.10)          (6.70)         
Hispanics 4.48 11.39 10.63
(1.95)          (5.56)          (5.08)         
By Gender:
Men 0.94 1.80 1.66
(1.11)          (2.27)          (2.10)         
Women -0.40 2.35 2.58
(1.02)          (2.34)          (2.27)         
Note: Table entries represent estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models for
outcome listed in column heading.  Models are estimated using data from the 1992-2001 NHIS.
Coefficients and standard errors in columns (2) and (3) are multiplied times 100.Table 11:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Medicare Eligibility on Death Rates (per 100,000 Pop) for Demographic Groups
White White Black Black Hispanic Hispanic
All Men Women Whites Blacks Hispanics Males Females Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Reg. Discontinuity Estimate
Age>=65 8.76 11.23 11.04 7.13 -1.28 14.09 10.26 9.82 0.24 -1.73 17.83 11.2
(36.82) (53.68) (28.58) (34.05) (117.42) (24.79) (52.46) (25.53) (148.50) (102.77) (34.63) (25.46)
Death Rate at Age 66
Observed 1,913      2,482        1,437        1,870        2,829        1,370       2,433       1,392        3,625       2,218       1,787       1,028      
Predicted by Pre-65 Trend 1,897      2,454        1,423        1,864        2,701        1,368       2,413       1,386        3,503       2,107       1,767       1,041      
Death Rate at Age 67
Observed 2,074      2,687        1,565        2,029        3,033        1,502       2,631       1,521        4,013       2,328       1,941       1,144      
Predicted by Pre-65 Trend 2,035      2,636        1,529        2,011        2,766        1,474       2,610       1,497        3,546       2,191       1,898       1,132      
Note:  Row labeled "Age>=65" presents estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models for outcome listed in column heading. Models are fit to age cells and include a cubic in age 
fully interacted with a dummy for age 65 or older. The numerator for age-specific death rates is the number of deaths at each age registered by NCHS in the Multiple Cause of Death Files for 
1989-1998 (pooled). The denominator is the postcensal estimate of the July 1 resident population of the United States at each age for 1989-1998 (pooled). Death rates are expressed per 100,000 
population. Table 12: Summary of Intergroup Variation in Reduced Form Estimates of Medicare Eligibility Effects
Gap in Outcome between Percent of Gap at Ages 
    Estimate of Equation (5):     Low Ed Minorities and Hi Ed 63-64 Closed By 
Outcome       d1       R
2
Whites, Ages 63-64 Medicare Eligibility
1. Percent Delayed Care in  -0.42 0.76 7.0 85
Past Year for Cost Reasons (0.09)
2.  Percent Did Not Get Care in -0.37 0.67 7.5 70
Past Year for Cost Reasons (NHIS) (0.11)
3.  Percent Did Not Get Care in Past -0.60 0.82 19.1 44
Year for Cost Reasons (BRFSS) (0.12)
4.  Percent Saw Doctor in Past Year 0.48 0.84 -5.5 123
(0.09)
5. Percent With Hospital Stay in 0.00 0.00 3.3 0
Past Year (0.03)
6. Percent With Flu Shot in Past Year 0.14 0.10 -13.8 14
(0.19)
7.  Percent With Cholesterol Test 0.21 0.08 -11.5 26
in Past Two Years (0.32)
8. Percent with Mammogram  0.16 0.05 -13.1 17
in Past Two Years (0.31)
9. Percent With Prostate Exam 0.35 0.11 -14.3 35
in Past Two Years (0.45)
10. Self Assessed Level of 0.77 0.66 -0.9 12
Health (1-5 Scale) (0.25)
Notes: See text for explanation. Appendix Table 1:  Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Change in Health Insurance
                               at Age 65, Alternative Data Sources
NHIS: 1992-2001 NHIS: 1997-2001 BRFSS: 1998-2002
All 8.60 8.02 9.50
(0.24)              (0.52)              (0.49)             
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education 5.28 4.68 7.00
 White Nonhispanic (0.27)              (0.57)              (0.46)             
Low Education 14.43 15.50 17.31
 White Nonhispanic (1.38)              (2.31)              (1.90)             
High Education 9.13 7.27 9.78
 Minority (1.13)              (1.32)              (1.78)             
Low Education 19.41 19.71 24.12
 Minority (1.56)              (2.05)              (1.73)             
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics 7.30 6.74 8.20
(0.24)              (0.51)              (0.36)             
Black Non-Hispanics 14.19 13.28 11.10
(1.08)              (1.40)              (1.58)             
Hispanics 16.88 14.31 19.01
(1.93)              (2.36)              (3.16)             
By Gender:
Men 7.32 6.83 7.94
(0.51)              (0.91)              (0.53)             
Women 9.75 9.11 10.81
(0.57)              (0.63)              (0.54)             
Note:  Table entries are estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models
for the probability of insurance coverage.  All models include quadratic in age, fully
interacted with dummy for age 65 or older.  Models in columns (1) and (2) use age measured
in quarters, for people age 55-75.  Models in column (3) use age measured in years for
people age 50-80.  Additional controls include survey year dummies, dummies for 
gender, ethnicity, education levels, and region.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are
calculated assuming a cluster structure by age.Appendix Table 2:  Estimates of Discontinuities at Age 65 in Employment, Marriage, Family Income, and Mobility
 Microdata                              Cell-Level Data From 1996-2002 March CPS:                                 
from 1992-    Married    Family    Family    Family   Moved to
2001 NHIS:    Spouse    Income    Income    Income New House
 Employed   Employed    Present   <$10,000   <$15,000   <$20,000 in Past Year
        (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6)         (7)
All -0.44 -1.27 -0.91 -0.42 -0.78 -0.10 -0.48
(0.96)          (1.01)          (0.70)          (0.45)          (0.63)          (0.63)          (0.33)         
By Ethnicity/Education:
High Education -0.78 -1.08 -1.40 -0.64 -0.68 -0.09 -0.65
 White Nonhispanic (1.34)          (1.02)          (0.76)          (0.31)          (0.48)          (0.65)          (0.32)         
Low Education 0.07 -2.65 1.77 0.16 -0.35 -0.19 -0.20
 White Nonhispanic (1.71)          (1.45)          (1.91)          (1.18)          (1.82)          (1.58)          (1.02)         
High Education -2.05 -1.15 -0.04 -0.76 -1.06 -0.42 -0.30
 Minority (2.64)          (2.19)          (1.78)          (1.10)          (1.39)          (1.36)          (1.38)         
Low Education 3.50 -3.89 -0.86 1.64 -1.01 0.49 -0.27
 Minority (1.63)          (2.22)          (2.40)          (1.73)          (1.92)          (2.07)          (1.73)         
By Ethnicity:
White Non-Hispanics -0.67 -1.14 -1.00 -0.54 -0.67 -0.06 -0.53
(1.15)          (0.98)          (0.72)          (0.37)          (0.58)          (0.61)          (0.33)         
Black Non-Hispanics 1.53 0.42 -1.25 1.60 -0.60 -1.07 0.12
(2.05)          (1.90)          (2.48)          (1.67)          (1.77)          (2.00)          (1.13)         
Hispanics 0.36 -2.86 0.74 -1.85 -2.68 -1.58 1.57
(2.87)          (2.10)          (2.63)          (1.83)          (2.43)          (2.64)          (1.56)         
By Gender:
Men 1.12 -1.07 0.52 -1.37 -2.01 -1.19 -0.77
(1.42)          (1.74)          (1.13)          (0.61)          (0.76)          (0.60)          (0.55)         
Women -1.83 -1.65 -2.25 0.44 0.30 0.88 -0.22
(1.14)          (0.81)          (0.83)          (0.70)          (1.00)          (0.90)          (0.50)         
Note: Table entries represent estimated coefficient of dummy for age 65 or older in models for outcome listed in column
heading.  Models in column (1) are fit to NHIS micro data; standard errors (in paretheses) are estimated assuming a cluster structure
by age.  Models in columns (2)-(7) are estimated using cell level data for ages 50-79 from March 1996-2002 CPS.  
Models include quadratic in age, fully interacted with a dummy for age 65 or older.  Models in column (1) include same
controls as models in column (3) of Table 3.